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paid for his services only on conviction had no basis in historical or judicial
precedent so as to warrant it to be due process of law; for even after the
justices of the peace became a minor part of the English system of courts,
there was no toleration of the dependency of the justice upon a conviction
for his fees.2 5 It is hard to see how these conclusions can be ignored or
rebutted.
R. S. O.
Workmen's Compensation-Injury Arising Out of and in the Course of
the Employment-Shooting of Non-Union Miner by Picket During Strike.-
Union miners employed by appellee went out on strike on April 1, 1932,
and appellee employed appellant and other nonunion miners to work in the
mine. On the day of the injury, long before the usual quitting time, appellant
and the other workers were ordered to stop working by the foreman. They
were ordered to the top where they found the mine surrounded by pickets.
Here the mine guards and bosses passed out rifles, ammunition, and dynamite
and told them to protect the mine property in the event the pickets entered
upon the mine property. They were also ordered to stay at the mine, under
cover, until the sheriff arrived to escort them to their homes. While so
waiting in the tipple and after several hours, appellant was shot in the arm
by one of the pickets. Held, appellant's injury, as a matter of law, arose
"in the course of and out of his employment."'
The question of Workmen's Compensation as respects injuries suffered
by employees due to labor disorders and industrial strife is a unique one
in spite of its seemingly possible prevalence. Dudine, J. far from overstated
the status of the law on this problem when he said, "It is a new question for
this court." In fact it would have been a new one for most courts, and
the law reviews and journals seem consequently to be quite devoid of notes
or articles precisely in point. Of course, technically, a solution may be
found in some interpretation of the clause "accident arising but of and in
the course of the employment,"'2 a clause, which of necessity is one that may
include everything, anything, or almost nothing. But it is not the purpose
of this note to deal with the many views already expounded on such interpre-
tation. 3 Suffice to state, that if it is true, as has often been said, that the
beauty of the law lies in its uncertainty, there is little danger df Workmen's
Compensation litigation marring that attribute when we find what is termed
a rough expression of the general principles 4 to be, "the statute imposing
liability embraces all injuries that arise out of and occur while the workman
injured is doing what a man under like facts and circumstances, engaged
in like employment may reasonably do, in the conduct or projection of such
work for the employer or in the promotion or safeguarding of such business,
or for the protection of the men and properties while used or engaged for
the purposes of the master's business." 5
In other words, the facts and circumstances of each case should govern
that case, and the facts and circumstances of the principal case being an
altogether new situation to an Indiana court, the decision was unhampered
2 5 Tumey v. Ohio (1926), 273 U. S. 510.
1 Bedwell v. Dixie Bee Coal Corp. (1934), 192 N. E. 723 (Ind.).
2 Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act, Acts 1917, p. 673.
8 R. A. Brown, "Arising out of and In The Course of the Employment" (1931-32),
7 Wis. L. R. 15 and 67; (1932-33), 8 Wis. L. R. 134 and 217; Heilbron, Accident "in
Course of Employment," (1930), 18 Cal. L. R. 551.
4 Harper, Law of Torts (1933), sec. 212.
5 Ex parte Majestic Coal Co. (1927), 208 Ala. 86, 93 So. 728.
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by precedent, giving the refreshing sight of an opinion which neither quoted
nor cited a previous decision as a basis for reason or result. If we evade
then, the technical interpretation of the workable, and worked, phrase set
out above, there remains yet a comparison of the principal case with those
of similar claimants for compensation which arose out of injuries caused
by unruly strikers, and a raising of some of the social and economic queries
which such a decision may affect.
In Rourke's Case6 and Lampert v. Siemons,7 strikebreakers were as-
saulted by strikers while going or coming from work and at some distance
from the place of employment. The courts in both cases were justifiably
reluctant to extend the employer's compensatory protection beyond the limits
of the plant, and although the injuries were held to have arisen out of the
employment, they did not occur in the course of it. The employers liability
was thus cut off, and compensation was not awarded. These cases, however,
are easily distinguishable from the principal case, since in them, the time and
the place of the injury definely precluded its having occurred "within the
course of the employment."' 8 There are two additional major cases where
the courts were not so stringently confined to hold the injury to have arisen
outside the course of employment, for in these cases the injuries were sus-
tained on the premises, and here the results were more in accord with the
principal decision. In Mulky v. Kiskiminetas Valley Coal Co.9 strikebreakers
were brought in and quartered on the mine property to avoid contact with
the strikers. After their regular working shift, and while sleeping in the
bunkhouse, a bomb was thrown thru the window, killing claimant's husbaifd.
The Pennsylvania court held it to be sufficiently during the hours of employ:
ment and thus within the course of the employment. The fact that the
Pennsylvania act does not require that the injury shall have "arisen out of
the employment"'10 would of course have no bearing on the case as it was
not one of those very unusual situations where one element may be present
but not the other. Again, in Baum v. Industrial Commission 1 strikers
invaded the workroom and in the scuffle that occurred in attempting to keep
them out, the single male employee, battling fiercely side by side with his
employer, was stabbed. The award was given, altho the annotations to the
case indicate the basis thereof might have been the employee's right to com-
pensation for injuries received while acting in an emergency coupled with
considerable heroism.12
Thus, altho the facts in the Bedwell case may still be open to some question
as to its technical compliance with the requirement of an "accident arising
out of and in the course of the employment," it is submitted that they are
actually stronger than similar cases so holding. The realistic question still
is, whether such decision is consistent with the intent and purposes of Work-
men's Compensation legislation. It is said "The industry to which the em-
ployees contribute their labor should bear the expense of all such economic
burdens which become a legitimate part of the commercial life as 'the over-
head' cost."' 3 "The risk of economic loss thru personal injury in the course
of production should be borne by the industry itself.' ' 4 It is submitted that
6 (1921), 237 Mass. 360, 129 N. E. 603, 13 A. L. R. 549.
7 (1923), 235 N. Y. 311, 139 N. E. 278, 31 A. L. P. 1085.
8 Granite Sand etc. Co. v. Willoughby (1919), 70 Ind. App. 112, 123 N. E. 194;
In re Ayres (1917), 66 Ind. App. 458, 118 N. E. 386.
9 (1924), 278 Pa. 551, 123 AtI. 505, 31 A. L. R. 1082.
10 Callihan v. Montgomery (1922), 272 Pa. 56, 115 Atl. 889.
11 (1919), 288 Ill. 516, 123 N. E. 625, 6 A. L. R. 1242.
12 6 A. L. P 1242.
13 Schneider, Law of Workmen's Compensation (1932), Vol. 1, p. 5.
14 Downey, Workmen's Compensation (1924), p. 21.
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there seems to be no rational grounds for excluding such injuries because
they originate in labor dissatisfaction, altho there may be other reasons,
political and economic ones. As Judge Thompson noted in the Baum case,
"Unfortunately, during the course of a strike, and in the excitement of events
which occur during a strike, trouble quite frequently arises."'1  It is evident
then, that quite often such "trouble" will produce an "accident arising out of
and in the course of the employment" as was present in the principal case, and
will thus be compensable to the injured strikebreaker.
The principal case thus leaves some interesting conjectural connotations.
Is it economically or socially desirable that scabs and strikebreakers obtain
such protection against possible violence? Is it commercially desirable that
the entrepreneur who chooses to quarrel with organized labor shoulder this
additional burden of possible injuries arising from such differences? Is it
conducive to peaceful settlement of labor disputes, and generally beneficial
to the social order to place organized labor in such position that in their
bargaining, they may be able to remind a hesitant industrialist, that if they
call a strike, overzealous strikers may thus cause additional expense to him?
Is it not quite just that the employer so protect faithful employees? Thus
far, the Indiana Appellate court has answered these questions in the
affirmative.
H. A. A.
15 Baum v. Industrial Commission (1919), 288 Ill. 516, 123 N. E. 625.
